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Defendant Google Inc. (“Google”) files this motion requesting that the Court certify its May
12, 2016 Order for appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Section 1292(b) allows for interlocutory review
of “controlling question[s] of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion”
where “an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation.” These standards are met here.
The Court‟s May 12 Order addressed a critical legal question and a controlling one in this
case: whether Google‟s choice about what websites to include in its search results is protected by the
First Amendment. Every prior decision had held that internet search engines offer editorial opinions
immune from liability under the First Amendment. Here, however, the Court allowed plaintiff eventures Worldwide, LLC (“e-ventures”) to overcome this vital constitutional protection, at least at
the pleading stage, by characterizing Google as having made a false statement of fact and by drawing
an artificial distinction between search rankings and search removals. Given that other courts have
come to different conclusions in nearly identical circumstances, there are, at a minimum, substantial
grounds for a difference of opinion about the Court‟s decision. And this issue is case-dispositive:
applying the First Amendment would end this case, without the need for any further proceedings.
The Court‟s ruling, moreover, will have real practical consequences. It undermines the First
Amendment protection that search engines (and other speakers) enjoy against claims seeking to hold
them liable for their exercise of editorial judgment. No less than its decisions about how to rank
search results, Google‟s decisions about what websites to include in its index reflect Google‟s
opinions about what material is most relevant to users and consistent with its policies. Existing case
law makes that clear. Plaintiffs should not be allowed to sidestep this result simply by alleging
anticompetitive motives. Allowing this case to proceed in the face of these concerns has enmeshed
Google in burdensome litigation that threatens to chill protected speech. Google respectfully
submits that this issue merits immediate attention by the Eleventh Circuit.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At its heart, this case is an attempt by e-ventures to hold Google liable for its editorial
decisions about what content to present to users of its search engine. Like other search engines,
Google uses its own algorithms to determine what online material should be included in a given set
of search results and in what order that content should be displayed. Dkt. 86 at 6. Google‟s search
results thus reflect a fundamentally subjective opinion about what items are most useful and relevant
in response to a given search query. Id. at 15. Google maintains search quality guidelines, which aim
to protect users from online material that may be irrelevant, misleading, or not responsive to their
queries. Id. at 4-5. If Google comes to believe that certain websites do not conform to those
guidelines, it may in some circumstances choose to exclude those sites from appearing in search
results. Id. This case arises from one such exclusionary action.
e-ventures operates a vast network of websites in connection with its business, which it
alleges to be “online publishing and research.” SAC ¶ 9. On September 18, 2014, after Google
concluded that e-ventures was not in compliance with Google‟s search quality guidelines, Google
exercised its editorial discretion by removing e-ventures‟ websites from its search index. Google did
not make any public statement, in its search results or otherwise, explaining what it had done or
why, though it informed e-ventures of the action privately so e-ventures could correct the issues that
had caused its websites to be excluded.
e-ventures filed suit against Google on November 4, 2014 (Dkt. 1), asserting claims from the
removal of its websites from Google‟s search listings. Plaintiff filed its Second Amended Complaint
(“SAC”) on November 2, 2015 (Dkt. 75). The SAC included claims under the federal Lanham Act
(15 U.S.C. § 1125) and Florida‟s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA), as well as
claims for defamation and tortious interference under Florida law. Dkt. 75 at ¶¶ 63-103. Google
moved to dismiss the SAC, arguing, among other things, that the First Amendment barred e-

-2-

Case 2:14-cv-00646-JES-CM Document 92 Filed 06/01/16 Page 5 of 14 PageID 768

ventures‟ attempt to hold Google liable for what were ultimately editorial opinions about what
material should be included in its search results. Dkt. 78.
In its May 12, 2016 Order, the Court granted Google‟s motion in part and denied it in part.
Dkt. 86. In regards to Google‟s First Amendment argument, the Court ruled that while Google‟s
search rankings were protected by the First Amendment as opinions, e-ventures had alleged that by
removing its websites, Google somehow communicated a factual statement that e-ventures had not
followed Google‟s policies. Id. at 15-16. Based on plaintiff‟s allegations, the Court concluded,
Google‟s removal decision was “speech [that] is capable of being proven true or false since one can
determine whether e-ventures did in fact violate Google‟s policies.” Id. at 16. In addition, the Court
held that because e-ventures had alleged that Google acted out of anticompetitive motives, Google
could not claim, at this stage of the case, that its removal decision qualified as an “editorial
judgment” immune from liability under the First Amendment. Id. Google has moved for
reconsideration of a separate aspect of the Court‟s Order (Dkt. 87); that motion is still pending, and
will not be affected by this certification request.
ARGUMENT
Section 1292(b) creates a mechanism for interlocutory appellate review of legal rulings. As
the Eleventh Circuit has explained: “The essential requirements for any § 1292(b) appeal, which are
set out in the statute itself, present us with three questions: (1) What is „a controlling question of
law‟?; (2) what is a „substantial ground for difference of opinion‟?; and (3) what does it mean for an
appeal to „materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation?‟” McFarlin v. Conseco Servs.,
LLC, 381 F.3d 1251, 1257 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)).
First, a controlling question of law is “what might be called one of „pure‟ law, matters the
court of appeals can decide quickly and cleanly without having to study the record.” Id. at 1258.
“Although the resolution of an issue need not necessarily terminate an action in order to be
„controlling,‟ it is clear that a question of law is ‟controlling‟ if reversal of the district court‟s order
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would terminate the action.” Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro
In Amministrazione Straordinaria, 921 F.2d 21, 24 (2d Cir. 1990).
Second, a “substantial ground for difference of opinion exists where reasonable jurists might
disagree on an issue‟s resolution.” Fortyune v. City of Lomita, 766 F.3d 1098, 1101 n.2 (9th Cir. 2014)
(quotation marks omitted). Where two courts have disagreed on the relevant issue, this criteria is
clearly met, but actual disagreement is not required for certification. “[W]hen novel legal issues are
presented, on which fair-minded jurists might reach contradictory conclusions, a novel issue may be
certified for interlocutory appeal without first awaiting development of contradictory precedent.”
Reese v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 643 F.3d 681, 688 (9th Cir. 2011).
Third, the material advancement requirement is satisfied where “resolution of a controlling
legal question would serve to avoid a trial or otherwise substantially shorten the litigation.” McFarlin,
381 F.3d at 1259. Each of these criteria is met in this case.
A.

Whether Google’s Removal of Plaintiff’s Websites Communicated an Opinion
Protected By The First Amendment Is A Controlling Question of Law

As an initial matter, the application of the First Amendment to plaintiffs‟ claims in this case
is a controlling legal question. The Court considered whether Google‟s exclusion of e-ventures‟
websites from search results communicated a statement of fact, rather than an opinion reflecting
editorial judgments protected by the First Amendment. In addressing that issue, the Court drew a
distinction between Google‟s choice in how to rank various websites in search results and its
decision whether to include those sites at all. The former, the Court said, involved protected
opinions; the latter, at least based on plaintiff‟s allegations, involved a factual statement that could be
proven true or false. Dkt. 86. at 15-16.
The characterization of Google‟s speech as fact or opinion is purely an issue of law. See Keller
v. Miami Herald Pub. Co., 778 F.2d 711, 715 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Whether the challenged statement was
one of fact or opinion is ... a question of law to be decided by the court.”). So too is the question
-4-
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whether the established First Amendment immunity for search result rankings applies to a search
engine‟s decision to exclude certain material from its search results. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 148 n.7 (1983) (“inquiry into the protected status of speech is one of law, not fact”). These
questions can be decided “without having to study the record” (McFarlin, 381 F.3d at 1257), based
on existing case law. Indeed, in the prior cases addressing the application of the First Amendment to
search engines, the courts have resolved these issues as a matter of law, based on the pleadings alone
and without any factual examination. See Zhang v. Baidu.com, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(motion for judgment on the pleadings); Langdon, Inc. v. Google, 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del. 2007)
(motion to dismiss); Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
27193, at *9-12 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003) (motion to dismiss).
Nor is there any doubt that these legal questions are “controlling.” Although a controlling
question of law is one that “disposes of a substantial part of the case, not necessarily the entire case,”
Horowitch v. Diamond Aircraft Indus., No. 6:06-cv-1703-Orl-19KRS, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73858, at
*4 n.1 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 2007), the constitutional issue here is case-dispositive. The Court
understood that if the First Amendment applied here, Google would be immune from liability for all
of plaintiff‟s claims. Dkt. 86 at 13-15 (observing that the “First Amendment can serve as a defense
in state tort suits”). As such, a determination by the Eleventh Circuit that Google‟s exclusion of eventures‟ website reflected a constitutionally protected opinion would mean that this litigation is
over. This is the paradigm of a controlling question of law. See, e.g., Williams v. Cruise Ships Catering &
Serv. Int'l, No. 03-60158-CIV, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7586 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2004).
B.

There is Substantial Ground for Difference of Opinion Regarding The Proper
Resolution of The First Amendment Question In This Case

It is equally clear that there is a “substantial ground for difference of opinion” as to the First
Amendment‟s application to Google. In allowing plaintiff‟s claim to survive, the Court considered
two important issues. First, it accepted the characterization of the removal of e-ventures‟ websites as
-5-
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being a statement of fact by Google capable of being proven true or false. Dkt. 86 at 15-17. Second,
the Court allowed e-ventures to use an allegation of bad faith to plead around Google‟s argument
that its actions reflected editorial judgments that are protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 16-17.
Google respectfully submits that both of these conclusions are incorrect, but at a minimum, they
certainly are ones with which reasonable jurists could disagree.
Exclusion Decisions As Statements of Fact. The Court‟s treatment of the line between
statements of fact and statements of opinion is contrary to established law. The Court acceded to
plaintiff‟s allegation that Google‟s statements were factual in nature. But that disregards the rule,
discussed above, that “[w]hether the challenged statement was one of fact or opinion is likewise a
question of law to be decided by the court.” Keller, 778 F.2d at 715. Because this is an issue of law, it
should not matter whether e-ventures alleged that Google made a factual statement rather than an
opinion. The court must come to its own legal judgment regarding the “protected status of speech.”
Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.7. In Keller, for example, the plaintiffs‟ contention that the editorial
cartoon at issue asserted false facts was not controlling. The Court looked at that issue for itself and
determined, as a matter of law, that the cartoon constituted an opinion protected by the First
Amendment. Keller, 778 F.2d at 715-18.
Beyond this threshold problem, the characterization of the speech at issue here as a factual
statement is highly contestable. The Court‟s ruling was based on the premise that a search engine‟s
decision to exclude websites from search results is materially different from its decision about how to
rank various websites. The Court suggested that while the latter reflects a protected opinion, the
former may be a fact capable of being proven false. Dkt. 86 at 14-15. This distinction is contrary to
the decisions of two other courts that have squarely held that search engine exclusion decisions
convey editorial opinions protected by the First Amendment.
In Langdon v. Google, the plaintiff specifically “allege[d] that Google removed his NCJustice
website from its search results.” 474 F. Supp. 2d at 627. And he asserted a legal theory very similar
-6-
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to the one here: that in removing his websites, “Google fraudulently implied it was legally compelled
to remove his website from its search results.” Id. The court dismissed this claim, just as it dismissed
the plaintiff‟s claims about how his sites were ranked. Id. at 629. The court explained that the First
Amendment prohibits attempts to force publishers to print materials they disagree with or do not
think are relevant. Id. As such, there was no meaningful distinction between efforts to compel
Google to “„honestly‟ rank Plaintiff‟s websites” and to include material in its search results. Id. Both
ran afoul of the First Amendment.
Similarly, in Zhang v. Baidu, the court concluded that the First Amendment protected a search
engine‟s exclusion of websites that violated its policies. The case had nothing to do with search
ranking; the sites at issue were categorically excluded from appearing in search results. 10 F. Supp.
3d at 435. The court held that the First Amendment applied to these “editorial judgments.” Id. at
441. Granting the defendant‟s motion to dismiss, the court explained that, as a matter of law, “[t]o
allow such a suit to proceed would plainly violate the fundamental rule of protection under the First
Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.” Id. at 440
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
As Langdon and Zhang make clear, established case law offers substantial grounds for
difference of opinion with the ruling here. These decisions have rejected the idea that search engine
removal decisions are any less worthy of constitutional protection than the ranking decisions that
this Court found to be “pure opinions of the website‟s relevancy to a user‟s search query, incapable
of being proven true or false.” Dkt. 86 at 15. But even taken on its own, this distinction is
problematic. The core principle “that search engine output results are protected by the First
Amendment” (Dkt. 86 at 15) applies just as much to Google‟s determinations about what websites
to exclude from search results as to the ranking of the websites that are included. There is no
meaningful difference between those two things that makes one an opinion and other a fact. Just
like ranking determinations, exclusion decisions are editorial judgments about what material is useful
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and relevant. These judgments do not reflect a factual statement about the world: they reflect
“opinions of the significance of particular web sites as they correspond to a search query.” Id. at *11.
That Google makes exclusion decisions in reference to a set of policy guidelines does not
make them into factual statements. After all, ranking decisions are informed by policy guidelines as
well. The court in Search King noted that page ranks were described as “honest and objective.” Search
King, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27193, at *9. But the court was emphatic that “statements as to the
purported objectivity of the PageRank system cannot transform a subjective representation into an
objectively verifiable fact.” Id. at 11. The same is true here. Whether to include certain websites in
search results is informed by the same editorial and policy considerations as ranking decisions. An
exclusion decision represents Google‟s opinion that the sites are of such low quality that they are not
worth including at all.
In short, this Court‟s determination that Google‟s search rankings are “pure opinions of the
website‟s relevancy to a user‟s search query” (Dkt. 86 at 15) should have led it to conclude that the
exclusion decisions at issue here are equally protected by the First Amendment. At the very least, it
is likely that other jurists would come to that conclusion.
Editorial Judgments and Allegations of Anticompetitive Motives. Equally debatable is
this Court‟s decision to allow e-ventures to overcome First Amendment protections for “editorial
judgments” simply by alleging that Google had “anti-competitive motives.” Dkt. 86 at 16. Other
courts have held that plaintiffs cannot so readily evade the First Amendment. In Search King, the
court granted Google‟s motion to dismiss even though the complaint alleged that “Google
purposefully and maliciously decreased the PageRanks previously assigned to” plaintiff and others,
and that it did so “because Google learned that PRAN was competing with Google and that it was
profiting by selling advertising space on web sites ranked highly by Google‟s PageRank system.”
Search King, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27193, at *4; see also Langdon, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 630 (applying
First Amendment notwithstanding allegation that Google acted fraudulently); Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d
-8-
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at 440 n.6 (plaintiffs‟ allegation that search engine “exercises editorial judgment in cooperation with
and according to the policies and regulations of China makes no difference to the analysis”).
These rulings reflect the reality that allowing conclusory allegations of bad faith to overcome
First Amendment immunity creates an all-too-easy way to sidestep those protections at the pleading
stage. This undermines the value of constitutional protection for speech, which can be chilled as
much by having to endure the process of litigation as by ultimate liability. As the Eleventh Circuit
has explained, “there is a powerful interest in ensuring that free speech is not unduly burdened by
the necessity of defending against expensive yet groundless litigation.” Michel v. NYP Holdings, Inc.,
816 F.3d 686, 702 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Forcing publishers to defend inappropriate suits through
expensive discovery proceedings in all cases would constrict that breathing space in exactly the
manner the [First Amendment] was intended to prevent.”).
So it is here. Allowing plaintiffs to subject editorial judgments to litigation based merely on
allegations of anticompetitive motive threatens the robust public discourse at the heart of the First
Amendment. Faced with the threat of lengthy lawsuits and burdensome discovery, many search
engines would hesitate to exercise their judgment regarding websites that they considered
problematic or irrelevant. That would undermine the utility of search engines and make it less likely
that users will find valuable content in response to their queries. It would also spell trouble for
publishers and editors in other contexts (including social networking services, user-generated
content platforms, and media outlets) giving aggrieved litigants a handy way to attack editorial
speech that they don‟t like. If a newspaper refused to run op-eds submitted by a writer that the
editors believed was providing misleading information in violation of the paper‟s editorial standards,
the First Amendment should protect that judgment even if the writer claimed that he was excluded
for malicious or anti-competitive motives. See, e.g., The Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440
F.2d 133, 135 (9th Cir. 1971). Reasonable jurists could conclude that the same protection should
apply in this case.
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Case 2:14-cv-00646-JES-CM Document 92 Filed 06/01/16 Page 12 of 14 PageID 775

C.

Resolution of the First Amendment Issue Would Materially Advance the
Ultimate Termination of the Litigation

Finally, there is no doubt that resolving the First Amendment question in Google‟s favor
“would serve to avoid a trial or otherwise substantially shorten the litigation.” McFarlin, 381 F.3d at
1259. Indeed, as explained above, it would end this case. Properly applied here, the First
Amendment provides an immunity that defeats any claim for defamation, tortious interference, or
unfair trade practices. See Dkt. 86 at 13-14; Atico Int'l USA, Inc. v. Luv N' Care, Ltd., No. 09-60397CIV, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73540, 2009 WL 2589148 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 19, 2009) (applying First
Amendment to dismiss claim under FDUTPA). Ending the litigation promptly on this basis would
make a material difference, moreover. Although this case has been pending for some time, Google
has only recently filed its answer to plaintiff‟s SAC, and the parties still face a significant amount of
discovery before they will be in a position to file motions for summary judgment. Prompt
interlocutory review of the Court‟s Order may make all those proceedings, and potentially a trial,
unnecessary. That would save considerable time and effort, and it would also vindicate the
important role that the First Amendment plays in protecting search engines from litigation based on
their editorial opinions regarding what items do, or do not, merit inclusion in search results.
* * *
The Eleventh Circuit has explained that courts considering requests for interlocutory review
under § 1292(b) requests should:
ask if there is substantial dispute about the correctness of any of the pure law
premises the district court actually applied in its reasoning leading to the order
sought to be appealed. The legal question must be stated at a high enough level of
abstraction to lift the question out of the details of the evidence or facts of a
particular case and give it general relevance to other cases in the same area of law.
And the answer to that question must substantially reduce the amount of litigation
left in the case.
McFarlin, 381 F.3d at 1259. That describes the First Amendment question in this case to a tee.
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CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Google respectfully requests that the Court certify its May 12, 2016 Order
for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
Dated: June 1, 2016
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